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Paradoxically, being involved with a company in bankruptcy can
be extremely profitable. As in so many other areas of life, the key
is timing. Profits are made by buying debt claims against bankrupt
companies at distressed prices and negotiating advantageous
treatment of those claims in the plan of reorganization. 1 While
trading claims on distressed debtors is not a new business, 2 it has
reached new heights of popularity in recent years. Pension funds
and other institutional investors have contributed more than $3
billion to "vulture" or "debt raider" funds, which buy strategic
blocks of debt issued by companies facing bankruptcy.3 The
increased investor interest in participating in chapter 11 situations
has been paralleled by an increasing supply of distressed debtors.
4
The result has been the development of an active market in claims
on insolvent companies.
5
t B.A. 1988, UCLA; M.B.A. Candidate 1992, Wharton Business School, University
of Pennsylvania; J.D. Candidate 1992, University of Pennsylvania.
1 See 'Debt Raiders' See Bull Market in Bankruptcies, L.A. Times, Oct. 21, 1990, at
DI, col. 6 [hereinafter 'Debt Raiders].
2 See Fortgang & Mayer, Trading Claims and Taking Control of Corporations in
Chapter 11, 12 CARDozo L. REv. 1, 25-26 (1990) (noting that 29 of the 64 members
ofthe First United States Congress bought steeply discounted debt securities issued
by the states to fund the Revolutionary War while the Congress considered legislation
calling for the federal government to assume the states' debts and pay them in full).
3 See Schifrin, Pay Up... or Else, FORBES, Aug. 6, 1990, at 74, 74-75. Chilmark
Partners, a Chicago investment firm, has raised $1 billion for its vulture fund while
Goldman, Sachs & Co. has launched a fund with $783 million in capital. The
Goldman fund projects annual returns of 25-35%. See 'Debt Raiders,' supra note 1.
4 See Total of Defaults for Junk Bonds Soared Last Year, Wall St. J., Jan. 9, 1991, at
C17, col. 6 ("Defaults of corporate junk bonds soared to a record $24.6 billion in
1990, equal to 8.5% of the high-yield issues outstanding and more than double 1989's
default total.... [M]unicipal-bond defaults climbed to $1.4 billion in 1990, a 37%
increase from 1989's $1.02 billion.").
5 See Schifrin, supra note 3, at 74.
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An investor who buys debt claims on a company in bankruptcy
hopes to profit in one of three ways: (1) by participating in a
reorganization plan which gives the investor cash and securities
valued at more than that invested,6 (2) by exchanging the pur-
chased claims for particular assets owned by the debtor,7 or (3) by
effecting a reorganization plan in which the investor exchanges
purchased debt claims for all or part of the equity of the debtor.
8
Each of these avenues requires that the investor exert a degree of
influence over the reorganization planning process in order to
ensure favorable treatment of his claims.
9
Influence in the reorganization process can be gained by shrewd
diplomacy or through a strategic legal position. A powerful legal
position in a chapter 11 case can be obtained by purchasing 34% of
the face amount of a well chosen class of debt securities. The
Bankruptcy Code requires that two-thirds in amount and one-half
in number of allowed claims voting in each class opt to accept the
reorganization plan in order for that plan to be confirmed.10
6 See, e.g., In re Odd Lot Trading, Inc., 115 Bankr. 97,99 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990)
(relating that investor arranged to buy claims at 60 cents on the dollar where
proposed reorganization plan provided for payment of 80 cents on the dollar in cash
plus a share of earnings on invested funds probably worth an additional five cents on
the dollar).
7 See, e.g., In re Apex Oil Co., 92 Bankr. 847, 849-50 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1988)
(reporting that investor bargained to receive debtor's refinery assets valued at more
than $545 million in exchange for $545 million face amount of secured notes that
investor had purchased from lenders for $396 million).
8 See, e.g., In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 118 Bankr. 282, 286 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990)
(relating that investorJaponica Partners sought a plan of reorganization which would
give it a controlling equity stake in the debtor in exchange for purchased claims).
9 Several sections of the Bankruptcy Code address the form and function of the
plan in the bankruptcy reorganization process. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1121-29 (1988).
There is a requirement that the plan specify the treatment of each class of claimant.
See id. § 1123(a)(3)-(4).
10 Section 1126(c) states:
A class of claims has accepted a plan if such plan has been accepted by
creditors, other than any entity designated under subsection (e) of this
section, that hold at least two-thirds in amount and more than one-half in
number of the allowed claims of such class held by creditors, other than any
entity designated under subsection (e) of this section, that have accepted or
rejected the plan.
Id. § 1126(c).
Another section provides, in relevant part: "(a) The court shall confirm a plan
only if all of the following requirements are met .... (8) With respect to each class
of claims or interests-(A) such class has accepted the plan; or (B) such class is not
impaired under the plan." Id. § 1129.
Of course, the requirement that every class accept the plan can be circumvented
by (1) leaving the rejecting class unimpaired in accordance with 11 U.S.C. § 1124
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Thus, a debt purchaser who holds 34% of an impaired class holds
a blocking position whereby he can prevent the debtor from
confirming any plan which does not treat advantageously the
purchased claims. Without confirmation of a reorganization plan,
the debtor cannot emerge from bankruptcy.
The influence which a debt raider can exert by virtue of his
blocking position is not absolute, however. Economically, the
longer the debt raider delays confirmation, the longer he goes
without any return on his investment. The opportunity costs can
become substantial. Legally, 11 U.S.C. § 1126(e) gives a bankruptcy
court the power to designate (disqualify) the vote of any claimant
who voted in "bad faith.""1 However, what constitutes bad faith
in voting is not clear. Neither "good faith" nor "bad faith" is
defined in the Bankruptcy Code. Therefore, judges face the
challenge of reconciling the majority's right to overcome a "nui-
sance" with the minority's right to appraise the proposed plan and
cast its vote in its own self interest. Court decisions are understand-
ably split as to how permissive the good faith standard is.
12
Meanwhile, voting power affects the influence which the parties
have relative to each other in the reorganization plan negotiations
because the negotiations are always a prelude to a vote. Thus, the
parties involved in a chapter 11 bankruptcy are vitally interested in
knowing when the line into bad faith is crossed.
Part I of this Comment outlines the'mechanics of trading claims
against distressed debtors and the role of the claim purchaser. Part
II examines the existing Bankruptcy Code provision concerning
good faith in voting and the history behind it. Part III argues that
the recent court decisions applying section 1126(e) have given
insufficient guidance to practitioners and do not adequately take
into account changing market conditions. Part IV establishes a
(1988), or (2) resorting to a "cram-down" proceeding under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)
(1988). See Klee, All You Ever Wanted to Know About Cram Down Under the New
Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 133 (1979). These possibilities, however, are not
to be feared by the shrewd debt raider. Because the distressed debt is usually
purchased at a deep discount, the purchaser will reap large profits from a plan which
leaves his class unimpaired. Further, as long as the purchaser buys claims which
belong to a sufficiently large or sufficiently senior class, the debtor is unlikely to have
the resources to effect a cram-down. See id. at 154.
1 This section states: "On request of a party in interest, and after notice and a
hearing, the court may designate any entity whose acceptance or rejection of such
plan was not in good faith, or was not solicited or procured in good faith or in accor-
dance with the provisions of this title." 11 U.S.C. § 1126(e) (1988).
12 See infra notes 78-119 and accompanying text.
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framework for applying tie section 1126(e) good faith in voting
requirement to claim purchasers in the future. This Comment




Investors buy claims against bankrupt companies by taking
assignment of those claims. The purchaser steps into the shoes of
the seller, assuming all of the rights and infirmities of the purchased
claim.15 In most cases, the assignment carries the right to enforce
the claim at par.
14
13 See Goldie v. Cox, 130 F.2d 695, 720 (8th Cir. 1942) (stating that an assignee
is subject to all equitable claims against the assignor); Fortgang & Mayer, supra note
2, at 13 n.74 (citing, inter alia, Shropshire, Woodliff & Co. v. Bush, 204 U.S. 186
(1907) (holding that priority wage claims remain priority claims in hands of claims
purchasers)).
14 See Moulded Prods., Inc. v. Barry, 474 F.2d 220, 224-25 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
412 U.S. 940 (1973); Kremer v. Clarke (In re Frank Fehr Brewing Co.), 268 F.2d 170,
180 (6th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 963, reh'g denied 363 U.S. 817 (1960) ("As
a general proposition, it is not against public policy for a creditor to assign a claim
to a purchaser even though it be for less than face value."); In re Lorraine Castle
Apartments Bldg. Corp., 149 F.2d 55, 57-58 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 728
(1945) ("[T]he prices which security holders pay for their securities in no wise affects
the measure of their participation in reorganization or their voting power."); Standard
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Deep Rock Oil Corp., 117 F.2d 615, 619 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
313 U.S. 564 (1941); Security-First Nat'l Bank v. Rindge Land & Navigation Co., 85
F.2d 557, 561 (9th Cir.), reh'g denied, 86 F.2d 3 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 613
(1936), rehk'g denied, 300 U.S. 686 (1937) ("The legal value or property right in an
obligation is the right to recover from the maker to the entire extent of his promise
to pay. The consideration given for a security by the holder thereof is immaterial.");
In re Automatic Equip. Mfg. Co., 106 F. Supp. 699, 706-07 (D. Neb. 1952), appeal
dismissed, 202 F.2d 955 (8th Cir. 1953).
The exception to the right to enforce an assigned claim at par comes into play
when the assignee is found to have a fiduciary obligation to the bankrupt estate. See
Fortgang & Mayer, supra note 2, at 25-38. A fiduciary obligation could possibly arise
from service on an official committee, see id. at 36, or from obtaining substantial
nonpublic information from the debtor. See In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 118 Bankr.
282, 297-99 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990) (holding that Japonica Partners became a
fiduciary because the debtor gave it substantial nonpublic information in connection
withJaponica's attempt to offer a plan in whichJaponica would acquire the debtor).
But see SEC Backs Trading By The Bondholders On Bankruptcy Panels, Wall St. J., Feb.
6, 1991, at A7, col. 3 (quoting an amicus brief filed by the SEC in the Allied Stores
bankruptcy arguing that bondholders who sit on official committees should still be
allowed to trade even though they are "temporary insiders" because to hold otherwise
would deprive debtors' committees of needed expertise).
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Bankruptcy Rule 3001(e) provides the mechanism through which
transfers of claims are formally effected. 5 On its face, Rule
3001(e) only requires that the transfer of the claim be unconditional
and that the court be properly noticed of the transfer.1 6 It has
been suggested that Rule 3001(e) should serve more than an
administrative function by requiring adequate disclosure to
transferors of what they may be entitled to if they hold their claims
until plan confirmation.17 At least three bankruptcy court judges
have agreed, finding some implicit requirement of disclosure within
Rule 3001(e). 8 The Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on
Bankruptcy Rules has proposed a new draft of Rule 3001(e)(2), but
it does not enlarge the essentially administrative role envisioned for
the court by the existing rule.
19
B. Trading: Reorganization Help or Hindrance?
A court's treatment of the interests of a claims purchaser will
depend to a large extent on whether the judge views the purchaser
as a help or hindrance to the reorganization process. Intuitively, a
judge is more likely to find that the claims purchaser acted and
voted in bad faith if that judge has a negative view of the role
played by the purchaser in the case. Accordingly, articulating the
costs and benefits of claim purchaser involvement proves useful.
15 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001(e).
16 See id. Rule 3001(e)(1) addresses claim transfers before proofs of claims have
been filed whereas Rule 3001(e)(2) deals with the post-proof case.17 See Note, Post-Petition Trading in Chapter 11 Claims: A Call for Augmentation of
FederalRule ofBankruptcy Procedure300l(e)(2), 58 FORDHAM L. REv. 1053, 1061 (1990)
("Without regulation that specifically addresses inadequate disclosure, the chapter 11
claims market will continue to operate without the information necessary to ensure
a fair and free marketplace.").
18 See In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 100 Bankr. 241, 242 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988)
(ordering transferees to give time to transferors to rescind their assignments where
claims were purchased at large discounts and plan of reorganization called for 100%
payoff, even though transferors were sophisticated financial institutions and had not
raised objections); In re Revere Copper & Brass, Inc., 58 Bankr. 1, 3 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1985) (requiring transferees to give increased disclosure and to allow transferors to
rescind sale even though no transferor had raised an objection); Supplement to the
Requirements of Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3001(e)(2) (Lifland, C.J.) (No. 86 B 11276)
(establishing chamber rules requiring increased disclosure by trade claim transferees
to both the court and potential transferors).
19 See COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
TO THE BANKRUPTCY RULES (Aug. 1989), reprinted in 265 Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) 77-78
(Oct. 12, 1989).
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Judge Lifland of the Southern District of New York has
expressed some of the perceived negative effects of trafficking in
claims:
Clearly, one of the 'evils' spawned by bankruptcy claims trading in
'mega' cases, the size of ]Eastern [Air Lines], is the substantially
increased burden associated with monitoring, administering and
objecting to claims which have been filed against the estate. This
increased administrative burden diverts the limited resources of
the Debtor's estate and has the potential for impeding the
reorganization process. Moreover, the Assignment, and other
transactions similar in kind, has the effect of uncontrollably
multiplying claims which, in turn, significantly increases the
administrative burden imposed on the estate associated with claims
administration.
2 0
In addition to the administrative burdens discussed above, Judge
Lifland and others believe that the transferor is 6ften taken
advantage of by a transferee who has superior knowledge of the
financial and operational state of the debtor and superior knowl-
edge of the chapter 11 process.
2 1
Other critics believe that opportunities for any particular player
in the reorganization process to cause delay should be mini-
mized. 22  The argument follows that to the extent a claims pur-
chaser brings delay by bargaining harder or vetoing a reorganization
plan, he causes an inferior result.
20 In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 119 Bankr. 440,444 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990). This
case involved a transferee (Amroc) who bought $2,547,312 face amount of trade
claims from Marriot for $2,114,269. See id. at 441. Amroc wanted the court to void
the transfer on the grounds that Marriot had not sold the entirety of its claim to
Amroc, violating the court's policy against splitting claims. See id. at 443. Amroc did
not want to complete the deal because Eastern's financial status had deteriorated and
the claims were not worth what Amroc had paid Marriot. See id. at 442. Ironically,
Judge Lifland approved the transfer, saddling Amroc with substantial losses. See id.
at 446-47.
21 Demanding increased disclosure by transferees and giving transferors an
opportunity to rescind assignment agreements implies that transferors are at an
informational disadvantage. See supra notes 17-18. See also 'Debt Raiders, 'supra note
1, at D8, col. 3 ("There's a potential for conflict with the bankruptcy courtjudge, who
may view a debt buyer as a disruptive force or unfair to other claim holders.").
22 One such critic points out:
Each of the critical actors in reorganization can, by making a decision (to
delay, to litigate, to reject a plan of reorganization), cause the firm and
those with a claim on, or interest in, the firm to bear costs of delay. The
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Judge Lifland notes that bankruptcy courts do not lack a remedy
for these perceived ills:
Bankruptcy courts are afforded the power to limit or prevent
bankruptcy claims trading where taking such action... will relieve
the debtor and its estate from a great administrative burden. In
addition to this Court's inherent authority under Bankruptcy Rule
3001(e)(2), § 105 of the [Bankruptcy] Code also authorizes this
Court to fashion appropriate remedies to protect against threat-
ened harm to, or interference with the sound administration of the
estate.
23
Courts have rarely expounded on the benefits of trading claims,
preferring to note simply that "it is not against public policy."
24
In fact, the participation of a purchaser of claims could substantially
benefit parties to the reorganization. Liquidity is the most apparent
benefit. The claims purchaser offers creditors the opportunity to
extricate themselves from the bankruptcy now at a sum certain
rather than waiting for an uncertain payoff at an uncertain time.
25
The liquidity may be particularly useful to claimants such as trade
creditors or employees who prefer to recoup losses through future
business relationships with the debtor. If these creditors were to
retain and press their claims, they would be forced to take an
decisionmaker bears only some of the costs that the decision triggers. This
is, in the jargon of game theory, a basic form of the prisoner's dilemma:
the aggregation of individualistic, 'rational' decisions leads to an inferior
collective result.
Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate Reorganization, 83 COLUM. L.
REV. 527, 544 (1983) (footnote omitted).
23 In re Ionosphere Clubs, 119 Bankr. at 445. Section 105(a) gives the bankruptcy
court the power to "issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or
appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title." See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1988).
24 Kremer v. Clarke (In re Frank Fehr Brewing Co.), 268 F.2d 170, 180 (6th Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 963, reh g denied, 363 U.S. 817 (1960). The rare case is
In re Lorraine Castle Apartments Bldg. Corp., 149 F.2d 55,57-58 (7th Cir. 1945), cert.
denied, 326 U.S. 728 (1945) (defending the claim speculator's role in the reorganiza-
tion rocess).
2PSee Fortgang & Mayer, supra note 2, at 4-5 (noting that many types of debt
including privately placed debt securities, bank loan claims, personal injury claims,
and claims for the rejection of executory contracts do not trade on any exchange and
prove illiquid and that the value of these debts is reduced by the brokerage costs, due
diligence costs, and time costs involved in selling them as well as by the credit risk).
See also 'Debt Raiders, 'supra note 1, at D8, col. 2 (explaining that "their investments
do have the salutary effect of allowing bankers,junk bond holders and trade creditors
to extricate themselves from bitter and time-consuming bankruptcies").
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adversarial role against the debtor to obtain full value, possibly
damaging future relations.
26
Contrary to Judge Lifland's concerns,27 the claims purchaser
may reduce the administrative burden on the debtor by consolidat-
ing many claims into one set of professional hands. The investor,
who has a large financial stake in the chapter 11 debtor, "has a
greater interest in the case which justifies the investor's commit-
ment of time and money."28 Communication with creditors is
made easier because there are fewer of them. Further, the investor
alleviates the collective action problem which makes active participa-
tion by and coordination among creditors difficult.29
The purchase of the debt claims may also serve to relieve the
debtor of contentious relations with the original lender group.30
Of course, a claims purchaser intent on receiving full value could
have more contentious relations with management than the
transferors had if the latter were complacent in pressing their
claims.3
1
In addition to bringing the benefits of liquidity and consolida-
tion, the claims purchaser may enhance the debtor's chances for
successfully reorganizing by being eager to accept securitiess2 while
other creditors are not.38 In fact, the most predominant set of
26 See Fortgang & Mayer, supra note 2, at 5.
27See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
28 Fortgang & Mayer, supra note 2, at 6. Ronald LaBow, whose Stonehill
Investment converted $300 million face amount of debt in Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel
for a controlling equity stake, said the time commitment of these investments is so
enormous and the complexity so great that "[i]f you can do two of these at once you
are very fortunate." 'Debt Raiders,'supra note 1, at D8, col. 5.
29 See generally M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 2 (1971) (noting
that rational, self-interested individuals generally will not act to achieve group
interests); Brudney, Equal Treatment of Shareholders in Corporate Distributions and
Reorganizations, 71 CALIF. L. REv. 1073, 1074 (1983) (describing conflicting pressures
to maximize enterprise value and to accord equal treatment to investors).
30 See, e.g., In re Apex Oil Co., 92 Bankr. 847, 864 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1988)
(recounting the contentious relations between debtor and its original lender group
in which lender group threatened to force liquidation and debtor threatened lender
liability litigation which would take years to adjudicate).
31 See All eyes on Distressed Companies: Takeovers of Distressed Companies on the Rise
CORP. FINANCING WEEK, Sept. 17, 1990, at 1, 10 ("Managements will increasingly be
forced to handle not only their financial trouble, but negotiations with sophisticated
creditors, rather than unsophisticated inadvertent creditors, caught off guard by a
company's restructuring or bankruptcy.").2 See Fortgang & Mayer, supra note 2, at 7 (noting in one case that "assignees of
bank creditors [were] to receive 50% of reorganized debtor's stock," and in a second
case that a claims purchaser "received 35% of the debtor's equity in return for
debentures purchased").
33 Professor Roe points out:
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creditors, banks, are legally prevented from taking long term equity
stakes in exchange for debt.-4 A claims purchaser making an
exchange for an equity stake strengthens the debtor's balance sheet
by decreasing the debt-to-equity ratio. This strength can, in turn,
facilitate new borrowing. 5 By supplying liquidity to creditors and
capital to debtors, a claims purchaser can be of substantial benefit
to the reorganization process.
II. BANKRUPTCY CODE SECTION 1126(e) AND ITS HISTORY
The legislative history of section 1126(e)16 does not suggest
that Congress gave much thought to the costs or benefits of claim
purchaser participation. The legislative history also provides little
guidance on what elements of a claim purchaser's behavior
constitute bad faith such that his votes should be disqualified.
3 7
The statement in the House Report accompanying section 1126(e)
was extremely limited in its examples of bad faith.38
[A] block may not be marketable ... for several years. Creditors with
special liquidity needs will therefore be undercompensated. Similarly, large
creditors that originally sought a low-risk investment will find themselves
with a risky common stock investment if they cannot quickly market the
block of new common stock that they receive in reorganization .... Risk-
avoiding large creditors would thus be undercompensated if forced to
receive common stock instead of the lower-risk debt that they would prefer
to receive from the reorganized firm.
Roe, supra note 22, at 575-76.
34 See Fortgang & Mayer, supra note 2, at 7 (citing 12 U.S.C. §§ 24(7), 1843(a) &
(c)(2) (1988)); 12 C.F.R. §§ 1.12, 225.21 (1990) (noting that nationally chartered
banks and subsidiaries of bank holding companies must dispose of stock received in
exchange for debt previously contracted within two years, although three one-year
extensions may be obtained).
" Whenjaponica Partners traded the Allegheny International debt claims it had
purchased for a 71% equity stake in the company, the company gained a solid debt-
to-equity ratio of 30%. As a result, Standard & Poor's raised the company's credit
rating from D to BB, "a higher upgrade than is typical of newly reorganized
companies." Companies Emerging from Chapter 11 Will Have More Equity, CORP.
FINANCING WEEK, Oct. 8, 1990, at 1 (quoting Standard and Poor's upgrade
statement).
31 See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(e) (1988); supra note 11.
37 See 5 COLIER ON BANKRUPTCY [ 1126.05[1], at 1126-16 (L. King 15th ed. 1991)
("'Good faith' ... was left undefined with the idea that the content of the phrase
would be developed and construed in accordance with the cases as they arose.").
38 The statement reads:
Subsection (e) permits the court to designate for any class of claims or
interests any person that has, with respect to that class, a conflict of interest
that is of such nature as would justify exclusion of that person's claim or
interest from the amounts and number specified in subsection (c) or (d).
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Determining how the good faith requirement affects a blocking
minority and the relevance of the fact that the blocker is a claims
purchaser requires reaching deeper into the legislative history.
Section 1126(e) reads substantially like section 7-309(e) of the Report
of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States. 3 9 The
note accompanying section 7-309 states that "[s]ubdivision (e) is
derived from section 203 of the [Bankruptcy] Act and... Rule 10-
305(d)."40  Thus, interpretation of section 1126(e) requires an
examination of the text and history of the superseded section 203
and Rule 10-305.41
A person might have such a conflict, for example, where he held a claim or
interest in more than one class. Exclusion from one class for voting
purposes would not require his exclusion from the other class as well. The
result is to overrule cases such as Aladdin Hotel Corp. v. Bloom, 200 F.2d 627
(8th Cir. 1953), which, though not in the bankruptcy context, would appear
to count votes for a reorganization plan motivated by an attempt to squeeze
out a minority of a class. In that case, the conflict of interest of those
voting for the plan was clear, but the court permitted the votes.
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 411 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6367. In Aladdin, equity holders acquired enough
bonds (72% of those outstanding) to amend the terms of the mortgage securing the
bonds. The amendment delayed maturity ten years. See Aladdin, 200 F.2d at 628.
Thus, the House Report statement addresses the case where a majority with an
ulterior motive binds an unwilling minority. The statement, however, does not
address the case where a minority blocks passage of a plan and does not mention how
a claims purchaser is to be treated within the bad faith framework.
39 Section 7-309(e) states: 'Disqualification of Acceptance or Rejection. For the
purpose of determining the requisite number of acceptances, the court may disqualify
any acceptance or rejection of a plan or modification of a plan if such acceptance or
rejection was not in good faith." 'REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY
LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 137,93rd Cong., 1st Sess., pt. II, at 250,
reprinted in COLLER ON BANKRuPTcY app. vol. 2, pt. I (L. King 15th ed. 1990).
40 Id. at 251; see also 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTcY 1126.05[1], at 1126-15 (L. King
15th ed. 1991) ("Section 1126(e) is derived from Chapter X Rule 10-305 of the Rules
of Bankruptcy Procedure .... Chapter X Rule 10-305(d) was derived from Section
203 of the [Bankruptcy] Act.... ").
41 Subdivision (d) of Rule 10-505 states:
Disqualification ofAcceptanceorRejection. For the purpose of determining the
requisite number of acceptances, the court after hearing on notice to the
creditor or stockholder may disqualify any acceptance or rejection of a plan
or modification of a plan if such acceptance or rejection was not in good
faith in the light of or irrespective of the time of the acquisition of the claim
or stock by such creditor or stockholder.
13A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTcY 10-305.06, at 10-305-11 (J. Moore & L. King 14th ed.
1977).
Section 203 states:
If the acceptance or failure to accept a plan by the holder of any claim or
stock is not in good faith, in the light of or irrespective of the time of
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By discussing the Aladdin example, the statement accompanying
section 1126(e) implies that the section was primarily aimed against
the case of a majority which tries to "squeeze out a minority
class." 42 By contrast, the history of section 203 and Rule 10-305(d)
makes clear that their intent was to limit the veto power held by
improperly motivated minorities. 43  The section and rule offset
the outcome of the prior leading case of Texas Hotel Securities Corp.
v. Waco Development Co.44
In Texas Hotel, Conrad Hilton defaulted on the lease of a hotel
in which he had invested substantial amounts of money making
improvements.45 When the lessor subsequently declared bankrupt-
cy, Hilton bought 33.5% of the lessor's outstanding mortgage bonds.
Hilton rejected all reorganization plans in the hope of forcing a
plan which would reinstate Hilton's management interest.46 The
Fifth Circuit felt that Hilton was within his rights:
A debtor corporation ... is not guaranteed ... a right to a
reorganization. It is given only the right to present a plan to its
creditors and stockholders for their acceptance, with the advantage
that the prescribed majorities in the classes affected can control
unwilling minorities. No legal wrong is done the debtor if it
cannot secure the required consents and is held to its original
engagements, for that is but leaving to the creditors their original
rights.
47
The SEC disagreed, concerned that the Hilton group could "utilize
their veto position to extort tribute from other creditors and
stockholders as the price of their assent to a plan."48 Thus,
acquisition thereof, the judge may, after hearing upon notice, direct that
such claim or stock be disqualified for the purpose of determining the
requisite majority for the acceptance of a plan.
Id.
42 See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 38, at 6367.
43 See 13A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 10-305.06, at 10-305-12 (J. Moore & L. King
14th ed. 1977) ("Section 203 and Rule 10-305 are intended to prevent creditors and
stockholders by use of obstructive tactics or of hold-up techniques to exact for
themselves advantages through acceptance or rejection of a plan, or to secure some
preferential treatment such as management of the company for the price of their
vote" (citing S.E.C. Commissioner (formerJustice) Douglas in House Hearings Before
the Committee on the Judiciaiy on H.A. 6439, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 180, 182 (1937))).
"87 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 679 (1937).
45 See id. at 398-99.
46 See id. at 398.
47 Id. at 399.
48 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISsION REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGA-
TION OF THE WORK, AcTIVrrIEs, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND
1991] 1403
1404 UNIVERSITYOFPENNSYLVANIALAWREVIEW [Vol. 139:1393
examining to what extent the superseded section 203 and Rule 10-
305(d) limited the veto power of a minority should shed light on
how section 1126(e) was intended to be applied.
A. Guidance Given by Superseded Section 203 and Rule 10-305(d)
Section 203 and Rule 10-305(d) made specific reference to
trading claims, 49 unlike section 1126(e).50 The phrasing suggests
that the court has considerable discretion in deciding how much
importance, if any, to assign to the timing and pricing of the
purchases:
The Rule, as well as § 203, does not forbid trading or transfer
of claims and interests, before or during reorganization, but
expressly makes time of acquisition a factor to be considered in
determining good faith. But time of acquisition is not control-
ling .... Likewise, the price paid by the assignee or seller of claims
or interests is an element to be considered, but not necessarily
controlling. In the absence of fraud, misrepresentation, over-
reaching or violation of fiduciary obligation calling for the exercise
of the equitable power of the court, the prices paid by security
holders for their securities in no wise affects the measure of their
participation in the voting.
51
The most specific guidance given the court on the intent of the
section and rule was that they were designed to discourage the
situation,
where a fellow goes out and buys securities at a default price and
then sits back in a nuisance or strategic position and seeks to
capitalize on that. It also covers the situation where he does not
REORGANIZATION COMMrrrEs 1936-40, pt. VIII, at 121 (1940), quoted in 6 COLLIER
ON BANKRUPrCY pt. 2, 1 9.21, at 1674 (J. Moore & L. King 14th ed. 1978).
49 See supra note 41.
5 0 See supra note 11.
51 13A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 10-305.06, at 10-305-13 (J. Moore & L. King
14th ed. 1977) (footnotes omitted) (citing In re Lorraine Castle Apartments Bldg.
Corp. Inc., 149 F.2d 55 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 728 (1945); In re P-R Holding
Corp., 147 F.2d 895 (2d Cir. 1945); Mokava Corp. v. Dolan, 147 F.2d 340 (2d Cir.
1945); In re Pine Hill Collieries Co., 46 F. Supp. 669 (E.D. Pa. 1942)); see also 5
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1126.0512], at 1126-18 (L. King 15th ed. 1991) (noting
that "the existence of trading in securities of the debtor prior to the commencement
of the case generally will not provide a basis for disqualifying the claim or interest of
a purchaser acquiring such securities so long as the purchase and sale complied with
applicable non-bankruptcy law"). Collier's conclusion is put in doubt by In re
Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 118 Bankr. 282 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990). See infra notes 104-108
and accompanying text.
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buy at a default price, but nevertheless is working a hold-up
scheme on those who are trying to get these securities in during
reorganization.
52
Courts face the challenge of reconciling the majority's right to
overcome a "nuisance" with the minority's right to appraise the
proposed plan and cast its vote in its own self interest.53  The
good faith rule was not intended to stop creditors from voting
selfishly.54  Each voter has the right to judge the plan offered
according to his own economic position and personal assessments.
Early on, courts recognized the inherent conflict between the right
to vote selfishly and the duty not to be a nuisance:
[Section 203] prescribes a standard of conduct defined by the
elusive term 'good faith', which must be met under pain of
disqualification. The test is plainly to be sought in the motives of
the holder of the claims. The Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion suggests in its brief that if assent is withheld to serve some
ulterior selfish purpose, good faith is wanting. If the emphasis be
placed on 'ulterior' rather than 'selfish' this seems to be as
practical a test as could be found. What is selfishness from the
standpoint of those who derive no benefit from conduct under
scrutiny often becomes enlightened self-interest if viewed from the
standpoint of those who gain by it. If a selfish motive were
sufficient to condemn reorganization policies of interested parties,
very few, if any, would pass muster. On the other hand, pure
malice, 'strikes' and blackmail, and the purpose to destroy an
enterprise in order to advance the interests of a competing
business, all plainly constituting bad faith, are motives which may
be accurately described as ulterior.
55
52 House Hearings Before the Committee on theJudiciary on H.R. 6439,75th Cong., 1st
Sess. 183-84 (1937) (statement of Commissioner Douglas), quoted in 6 COLLER ON
BANKRUPTCY pt. 2, 1 9.21, at 1675 (J. Moore & L. King 14th ed. 1978).
53 See 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY pt. 2, 19.21, at 1677 (J. Moore & L. King 14th
ed. 1978) (noting that "democratization" of the reorganization process was a major
goal of the Bankruptcy Act).
'See id. at 1676 (citing House Hearings Before the Committee on theJudiciay on H.R.
6439, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 180-81 (1937) (statement of Commissioner Douglas));
Teton, Reorganization Revised, 48 YALE L.J. 573, 601-02 (1939).55 In re Pine Hill Collieries Co., 46 F. Supp. 669, 671 (E.D. Pa. 1942); see also
Kremer v. Clarke (In re Frank Fehr Brewing Co.), 268 F.2d 170, 180 (6th Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 362 U.S. 963, rehk'g denied, 363 U.S. 817 (1960) ("Self interest is not the
same as ulterior motive or bad faith. The purchase of creditors' claims for the
purpose of securing approval of a plan which the purchaser considers to be in his
best interests does not of itself amount to bad faith so as to invalidate the plan.").
1991] 1405
1406 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 139:1393
Further, courts which construed section 203 found no good faith
problem with amassing sufficient negative votes to block a plan.
"Such minority may choose to use the veto power, which the law
thus allows it to obtain, rather than go to the expense of producing
testimony or attempting to persuade the other interests and the
Court that the plan is not a good one.
"56
B.Judicially Developed Frameworks for Application of the
Good Faith Standard
There are two routes by which a claims purchaser with a
minority blocking position enters the realm of bad faith. These
routes are developed in Young v. Higbee Co.57 and In re P-R Holding
Corp.
58
In Young v. Higbee Co., the Supreme Court cast some light on
where the dividing line is between a bad faith hold-up and a
legitimate self-interested veto:
[Texas Hotel] held that a creditor could not be denied the privilege
of voting on a reorganization plan, ... although he bought the
votes for the purpose of preventing confirmation unless certain
demands of his should be met. The hearings make clear the
purpose of the Committee to pass legislation which would bar
creditors from a vote who were prompted by such a purpose.5 9
In Young, two preferred shareholders filed suit to subordinate a
large unsecured loan purchased by insiders of the bankrupt.
60
The two preferred shareholders subsequently sold their stock to the
insiders being sued for $115,000 when the stock had a market value
of $17,000.61 The lawsuit was thereby extinguished, to the detri-
ment of all other preferred shareholders. The Supreme Court
found the selling preferred shareholders to be in bad faith because
they took "more than the ratable equivalent of their proportionate
56 In re Pine Hil 46 F. Supp. at 672; see also In re P-R Holding Corp., 147 F.2d
895, 897 (2d Cir. 1945) ("The mere fact that a purchase of creditors' interests is for
the purpose of securing the approval or rejection of a plan does not of itself amount
to 'bad faith.'"); Mokava Corp. v. Dolan, 147 F.2d 340, 344 (2d Cir. 1945) (holding
that one who purchased claims in a particular class in order to frustrate the
acceptance of that class was not acting in bad faith).
324 U.S. 204 (1945).
58 147 F.2d 895 (2d Cir. 1945).
59 324 U.S. at 211 n.10 (citation omitted).
60 See id. at 206.
61 See id. at 207.
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part of the bankrupt assets."62 The Court's holding and its
statement regarding Texas Hotel suggest that bad faith occurs when
a claimant demands better treatment than the rest of his class will
receive.63
By distinction, one who vetoes a plan to improve his own
position and the positions of all others similarly situated presumably
should not be held in bad faith.64 The premise that a claims
purchaser will be found to have voted in good faith as long as he
endeavors to improve the return for all other claimants in his class
puts great importance on the classification scheme.65 This applica-
62 Id. at 211.
63 In Texas Hote4 Hilton was holding out for a management interest in the
reorganized entity. See supra note 46 and accompanying text; see also In re P-R
Holding Corp., 147 F.2d 895, 898 (2d Cir. 1945) (finding bad faith where plan
proponents purchased the claims of objectors for 50 cents on the dollar in cash when
plan proposed to pay others in class 50 cents on the dollar in securities); In re Fuller
Cleaning & Dyeing Co., 118 F.2d 978, 979 (6th Cir. 1941) (finding bad faith where
plan proponents agreed to buy certain but not all bonds for 90% of face value should
the plan be approved, thus inducing key acceptances); Fortgang & Mayer, supra note
2, at 96 ("[T]he Act did not, and the Code does not, allow 'greenmail.' That is, an
investor with a blocking position (a 'blocker') cannot capitalize on that position to
receive treatment different from the rest of the creditors or shareholders in the
blocker's class.").
The finding in P-R Holding raises interesting questions which it may not have
intended. The decision stated "there is 'bad faith' when those purchases result in a
discrimination in favor of the creditors selling their interests." P-R Holding, 147 F.2d
at 897. The court disapproves of claimants who object to the plan, sell, and thereby
fare better than the claimants who accept. Presumably this transaction would not
have been in bad faith had the cash payment on sale been something less than 50%,
the amount accepting creditors received in securities, which are less desirable than
cash. The question of how much less than 50% makes this transaction acceptable is
left open. See 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY pt. 2, 1 9.21, at 1682 n.50 (J. Moore & L.
King 14th ed. 1978). Further, P-R Holdingleaves open the good faith of a transaction
in which a plan proponent buys the objectors' claims at a price which appears to be
a discount but which ends up being a premium because the deteriorating finances of
the debtor do not allow payout at the level that was anticipated in the original plan.
64 See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text (discussing Pine Hill); In re Radio-
Keith-Orpheum Corp., 106 F.2d 22 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 622 (1939); In re
Michigan-Ohio Bldg. Corp., 97 F.2d 845 (7th Cir. 1938).
65 The debtor, in deciding the class scheme may try to gerrymander the vote in
order to dilute the impact of unfriendly claimants. See, e.g., Roe, The Voting
Prohibition in Bond Workouts, 97 YALE L.J. 232, 267 (1987) ("[B]ondholders cannot be
sure of how their claims will be classified. They have to fight to avoid classification
with other creditors, which would dilute the bondholders' vote."); see also In re U.S.
Truck Co., 800 F.2d 581,584 (6th Cir. 1986) (allowingclass gerrymander even though
debtor admitted and the court was aware that the purpose of the segregation was to
ensure the approval of at least one impaired class). Compare 3 NORTON BANKRUPTCY
LAW AND PRACTICE § 60.05, at 7 (1986) ("Unsecured claims will, generally speaking,
comprise one class, whether trade, tort, publicly held debt or a deficiency of a
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tion of the good faith rule leaves the claims purchaser ample
opportunity for profit as long as the others in his class share in the
gains. Alternatively, the claims purchaser can avoid sharing the
gains by buying all of the claims in his class, should he have the
resources and find willing sellers.6
In re P-R Holding Corp.67 develops the second route by which
a claims purchaser with a minority blocking position enters the
realm of bad faith:
The mere fact that a purchase of creditors' interests is for the
purpose of securing the approval or rejection of a plan does not
of itself amount to 'bad faith.' When that purchase is in aid of an
interest other than an interest as a creditor, such purchases may
amount to 'bad faith' under section 203 .... 68
The language "an interest other than an interest as a creditor" sheds
some light on the distinction between an ulterior motive, which is
bad faith, and a simply selfish motive, which while not commend-
able, is not bad faith.6 9 Presumably, the interest of a creditor as
creditor is to maximize the return on the debt he is owed. Given its
most permissive interpretation, this test would only find bad faith
in the motives discussed as ulterior in Pine Hill.70 Given its least
permissive interpretation, this test would find bad faith in any vote
which had as its motive the furtherance of a relationship with the
reorganized entity.
71
secured creditor.") with 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY I 1122.03[1][b], at 1122-7 (L.
King 15th ed. 1991) (noting "that the Code does not require that all claims that are
substantially similar be placed in the same class").
6 See Mokava Corp. v. Dolan, 147 F.2d 340, 344 (2d Cir. 1945) (holding that the
purchaser of an entire class of mortgage bonds had the right to vote those claims
against the reorganization plan, thereby blocking confirmation, even though the
original holders had voted in favor of the plan before selling).
67 147 F.2d 895 (2d Cir. 1945).
6 8 Id. at 897. Additionally, the court in P-R Holding found bad faith on the
discrimination theory described supra notes 57-66 and accompanying text.
69 See supra notes 37 & 54 and accompanying text.
70 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
71 For example, the pursuit of a relationship as stockholder, manager, supplier,
employee, lender, or favored customer would lead to a finding of bad faith.
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C. Effect of Finding of Bad Faith in Voting
If the court does decide that the claims purchaser has cast his
votes in bad faith, the court is limited in the remedy it can apply.
"The Code does not give the court power under section 1126(e) to
reduce the amount of claims or interests for voting purposes but
only permits the court to disqualify in toto an acceptance or
rejection of the claim or interest of a particular entity."72 Thus,
votes cast in bad faith are simply not counted at all. The claim
purchaser's right to collect his pro rata share of whatever payout is
approved is not impaired.
One should note that disqualification of his votes does not leave
the claims purchaser totally without influence over the outcome of
the vote. When the purchaser's votes are found to be in bad faith,
his claims have no voting rights, so the votes of the claim holders
who sold to the purchaser are not reinstated. 73 Thus, the claims
purchaser who wishes to block a plan need only buy the claims of
holders who would otherwise accept the plan to retire those
acceptances. Fewer rejection votes will then be necessary to block
confirmation of the plan.
74
72 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY [ 1126.05[2], at 1126-18 (L. King 15th ed. 1991).
The courts were limited to the same remedy under section 203 and Rule 10-305(d).
See 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY pt. 2, 1 9.21, at 1681 (J. Moore & L. King 14th ed.
1978) (citing H.R. REP. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1937)).
73 See, e.g., P-R Holding 147 F.2d at 898 (refusing to reinstate the votes of former
holders who sold to bad faith purchasers). The P-R Holding court confirmed the
reorganization plan even though the claims purchaser's acceptance votes were
disqualified because there were still enough votes for acceptance. The court was
aware that all of the selling claimants had voted to reject, and that those rejections
would have been sufficient to block the plan. However, the court refused to reinstate
the negative votes of the selling claimants: "To permit the votes of former certificate
holders to be counted would be to permit those with no interest in the plan to
control its acceptance." Id.
74 To illustrate, suppose that the debtor has issued $100 face amount in bonds.
Before the claims purchaser enters the picture, holders of $74 face amount of the
bonds approve of the plan while holders of $26 face amount of the bonds disapprove.
Clearly, the debtor has the two-thirds face amount approval necessary to confirm a
plan. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. Assume that before the final vote,
a claims purchaser desiring to block confirmation buys $25 face amount of bonds
from holders who would otherwise accept the plan. The vote would now be 49%
accepting and 51% rejecting. Further assume that the claims purchaser is found to
have voted in bad faith and his votes are disqualified. The vote is now $49 accepting
and $26 rejectingwith a total pool of $75 voting. The corresponding percentages are
65.3% accepting and 34.7% rejecting, meaning plan confirmation is blocked even
though the claims purchaser was not permitted to participate in the vote.
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This strategy is especially potent when the class of debt claims
involved is widely held and solicitation of votes is therefore difficult.
Section 1126(c) requires two-thirds face amount approval of those
holders who actually vote.75 By buying the claims of holders who
are likely to vote and likely to accept,76 the purchaser can fashion
a blocking position out of a group of rejecting voters who hold a
relatively small percentage of the total outstanding claims in the
class.
77
Ill. RECENT APPLICATIONS OF GOOD FAITH IN VOTING
RULES TO CLAIMS PURCHASERS
Courts which have been called upon to judge the good faith of
a claims purchaser under section 1126(e) of the Bankruptcy Code
have all purported to follow the two models developed under the
Bankruptcy Act.78 However, these recent decisions applying the
75 The statute specifically states that a plan is accepted by a class of claims when
at least two-thirds in amount... of the allowed claims of such class ... have accepted
or rejected the plan." 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (1988) (emphasis added). See 5 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY1 1126.03, at 1126-12 (L. King 15th ed. 1991) (stating that "only claims
actually voted count in determining whether the requisite majorities in number and
amount are met").
76 For example, large or institutional claim holders.
77 To illustrate, suppose that a debtor has issued $100 face amount in bonds.
Suppose further that the claim purchaser's $25 face amount claim has been
disqualified and that holders of $45 face amount have not returned vote solicitations.
In this case, only the votes of holders of $30 face amount of claims are counted.
Rejection votes by holders of $11 face amount of claims, 36.7% of those voting but
only 11% of the total allowed claims in the class, are enough to block confirmation
of the plan. See, e.g., In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 118 Bankr. 282, 287 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.
1990) ("Although Japonica purchased less than 1/3 of the claims in Class 4.AI.2, its
negative votes were sufficient to defeat the debtor's plan in that class because of the
large number of claims in Class 4.AI.2 that did not vote.").
7s These models are: (1) the differential treatment of claims within the same class
model developed in Young v. Higb ee Co., 324 U.S. 204 (1945), discussed supra notes
57-66 and accompanying text, and (2) the ulterior motive model developed in In re
P-R Holding Corp., 147 F.2d 895 (2d Cir. 1945), discussed supra notes 67-71 and
accompanying text. See, e.g., In re Federal Support Co., 859 F.2d 17, 19 (4th Cir.
1988) ("It is well settled... that good faith in casting a vote does not require of the
creditor a selfless disinterest. Each creditor is expected to cast his vote in accordance
with his perception of his own self-interest, but he may not act with an ulterior or
coercive purpose." (citing Young, 324 U.S. at 211 and P-R Holding, 147 F.2d at 897));
Allegheny, 118 Bankr. at 288-89 (same); In re Gilbert, 104 Bankr. 206, 215-16 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 1989) (same); In re MacLeod Co., 63 Bankr. 654, 655 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1986) (same); In re Featherworks Corp., 36 Bankr. 460,463 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (finding
bad faith where a creditor was paid outside of the bankruptcy plan to change its
vote); In re Landau Boat Co., 8 Bankr. 432,434 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981) (citing Young,
324 U.S. at 210-11).
TRADING CLAIMS IN CHAPTER 11
models leave difficult questions regarding the permissiveness of the
good faith standard of section 1126(e).
A. Decisions Suggesting a More Permissive Standard
One set of decisions gives the claims purchaser wide latitude to
influence the reorganization process. In re Gilbert 9 allowed a
creditor who held a claim in class III and who was an associate of
the debtor to buy two claims in class X in order to control the vote
of the latter class.80 The judge was not troubled by the admissions
that the creditor made the purchases to protect his existing claim in
the other class 81 and that the purchases were made at deep dis-
counts.8 2 The decision stated "[a]s long as a creditor acts to
preserve what he reasonably perceives as his fair share of the
debtor's estate, bad faith will not be attributed to his purchase of
claims to control a class vote."83 Thus, voting a claim in one class
in support of a claim in another class is not an ulterior motive;
rather, the strategy legitimately furthers the creditor's self-inter-
est.
84
Gilbert concludes that purchasing claims to control the vote in
one class for the benefit of a claim in another class is not a purchase
in aid of "an interest other than an interest as a creditor" as
developed by P-R Holding.8 5  Presumably, Gilbert reaches this
conclusion because the purchaser was a creditor in both classes.
86
This outcome greatly enhances the strategic options open to the
claims purchaser. Under Gilbert the claims purchaser can find a
79 104 Bankr. 206 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1989).
80 See id. at 208, 217.
81 See id. at 216 ("[Creditor's] testimony was that the sole purpose behind his
purchase and subsequent vote of the [purchased] claim was to protect his other claims
against Debtors' estate.").
82 The creditor purchased claims of $169,571 and $143,020 for $21,500 and
$5,000, respectively. The plan the creditor was helping to get confirmed called for
the creditor to be paid only $4,200 for the $143,020 claim, further evidencing that
the claim was purchased for a purpose other than pure speculative profit. See id. at
208.
83 Id. at 217.
4 See id. at 216 ("Part of his self-interest lies in protecting his $15,000.00 claim
classified in [Class III].").
85 See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
86 Had the claims been purchased to control the vote of one class in order to aid
the purchaser's interest as a stockholder, the case would very closely resemble the
situation which the Eighth Circuit approved of in Aladdin Hotel Corp. v. Bloom, 200
F.2d 627 (8th Cir. 1953), and which the legislative statement accompanying § 1126(e)
expressly disapproved. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
1991] 1411
1412 UNIVERSITYOFPENNSYLVANIALAWREVIEW [Vol. 139:1393
bankruptcy situation and target two classes, A and B, one for its
profit potential and the other for its strategic voting position. If a
court held, contrary to Gilbert, that voting claims in one class in
support of claims in another class is bad faith,87 the claims pur-
chaser would instead have to find a bankruptcy situation in which
a single class offers both sufficient profit and voting power. The
latter bankruptcy situation will be more difficult to find.
Another area in which courts have been permissive in their
application of the section 1126(e) good faith standard involves the
power of a claimant who is being sued by the debtor to veto the
debtor's reorganization plan. In re Landau Boat Co.8 8 allowed a
claimant who was being sued by the debtor in antitrust to vote to
reject a plan which would pay 10% of claims. 89 The rejection
would force the liquidation of the debtor, yielding the creditors
nothing. The debtor charged that the claimant voted with the
ulterior motive of weakening the prosecution of the antitrust suit
and was thus in bad faith under section 1126(e). 9° The court
refused to find bad faith. The court speculated that completely
writing off the debt may have been more valuable to the claimant
than a 10% payment and thus the debtor's conclusion of an ulterior
motive was not "inescapable." 91 The court also found that the
claimant was under no obligation to explain its vote.9 2 Landau
Boat suggests that the objector carries a heavy burden of showing
bad faith as the result of an ulterior motive. A possible legitimate
motive made a present improper motive uncompelling.
93
87 See infra notes 116-19 and accompanying text (discussing Il re Allegheny Int'l,
Inc., 118 Bankr. 282 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990)).
88 8 Bankr. 432 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981).
89 See id. at 433.
90 See id.
91 Id. at 435.
92 See id. (stating that "[a]Ithough there are many reasons why an unsecured
creditor would reject a plan paying it some money, [claimant] has offered no
explanation for its rejection nor is it obligated to do so").
93 See In re Federal Support Co., 859 F.2d 17, 20 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that a
claimant which was the defendant in debtor's antitrust suit was not in bad faith in
vetoing debtor's plan of reorganization where the claim was the debtor's sole
remaining asset).
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B. Decisions Suggesting a Less Permissive Standard
Another set of decisions limits the claims purchaser's influence
over the reorganization process. In re MacLeod Co.94 addressed the
relatively easy case where the claimants who sought to block
approval of the debtor's plan directly competed with the debtor
through a company that the claimants began while employees of the
debtor.95  Citing P-R Holding 6 and In re Pine Hill Collieries
Co., 97 the court found the votes to be cast in bad faith as the
claimants had the ulterior motive of increasing their own business
at the expense of a liquidated debtor.
98
In re Allegheny Internationa Inc.99 is arguably the most impor-
tant of the cases construing the good faith requirement of section
1126(e) to date. The forty-six page decision was very recent,
involved a large debtor, and received an enormous amount of
press. 100 In Allegheny, an investment firm called Japonica Partners
("Japonica") purchased enough claims in two classes to exercise a
blocking position in each. 10 1 Japonica subsequently offered its
own reorganization plan and proceeded to buy more claims in an
effort to secure its approval. 0 2 Japonica's clear intention was to
hold as much equity in the reorganized debtor as possible.1
03
When neither the debtor's plan norJaponica's plan won approval,
the court found that Japonica's votes were in bad faith and
confirmed the debtor's plan.1
0 4
After noting that there were few precedents, and none con-
trolling, concerning section 1126(e), the court undertook a
94 63 Bankr. 654 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1986).
95 See id. at 654-55.
96 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
97 46 F. Supp. 669 (E.D. Pa. 1942); see supra note 55 and accompanying text.
98 MacLeod, 63 Bankr. at 655-56.
99 118 Bankr. 282 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990).
100 Allegheny Int'l, Inc. (renamed Sunbeam-Oster since emerging from bankruptcy
in August 1990) has over $1 billion in annual revenues. For popular press articles
dealing with the relevant aspects of the bankruptcy, see Franklin, Battle for Allegheny:
Judge Warns Investors Not to FollowJaponica's Tactics, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 11, 1990, at 5, col.
2.; Schifrin, supra note 3, at 74;Judge Clears Allegheny Dea4 N.Y. Times,July 17, 1990,
at D5, col. 5.
101 See Allegheny, 118 Bankr. at 286-87.
102 See id. at 295-96.
103 See id. at 286.
104 See id. at 319-20.
1991] 1413
1414 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 139:1393
considered review of section 203 of the Bankruptcy Act and the
cases thereunder.1 0 5 Judge Cosetti held that:
Although [Japonica] testified that [it] voted against the plan for
economic reasons, the court does not find the economic reasons
offered byJaponica creditable. We find thatJaponica acted 'in aid
of an interest other than an interest as a creditor....' In re P-R
Holding, 147 F.2d at 897. The overriding fact that causes this court
to reach this conclusion is thatJaponica chose to buy claims which
gave it unique control over the debtor and the process. With one
minor exception, Japonica purchased its claims-and became a
creditor-after the debtor's disclosure statement was approved.
Japonica knew what it was getting into when it purchased its
claims. Japonica is a voluntary claimant. IfJaponica was unsatis-
fied by the proposed distribution, it had the option of not
becoming a creditor.
0 6
The court's statements imply that actually using a blocking position,
acquired through purchasing claims, is per se bad faith: "[i]f, as in
the instant case, an outsider to the process can purchase a blocking
position, those [other] creditors and interest holders are disenfran-
chised. Moreover, Japonica, who chose to become a creditor,
should not have veto control over the reorganization process."
10 7
Allegheny creates the "poison pill" of bankruptcy. According to
Allegheny, a claims purchaser who enters the reorganization process
at an advanced stage will have his votes disqualified if he crosses the
threshold of ownership of one-third of a class and tries to use the
accompanying veto power to improve the payout to his class.
Japonica's purpose in exercising its veto was to gain control of
the debtor. The question is open to debate as to whether this
purpose is ulterior and therefore bad faith or, on the other hand,
is a legitimate self-interested attempt to maximize returns by taking
equity from a debtor who could not afford to pay cash.10 8 How-
105 See id. at 287-89.
106 Id. at 289.
1
0 7 Id. at 290.
108 This question is especially difficult in the context of Allegheny because two
separate good faith issues unfortunately become blended. Japonica proposed its own
reorganization plan and tried to win its approval by buying enough claims to compose
the necessary majorities. See id. at 297. Judge Cosetti found that "[t]he control tactic
of this tender offer itself was extremely inequitable. It placed unfair choices on the
debenture holders. It constitutes bad faith." Id. at 296. The court also held that
Japonica acquired inside information in the course of the due diligence it performed
in connection with its proposed plan. This information gave Japonica status as a
fiduciary. See id.
TRADING CLAIMS IN CHAPTER 11
ever, if the "overriding" consideration is that the claims purchaser
is a voluntary creditor, an "outsider," the motive question will not
be adequately addressed.10 9 Even the claims purchaser who seeks
only an increased cash payout for his claims and tries to gain
influence through the power of the vote will fail prey to the poison
pill. The result is that the claims purchaser and the original claim
holder are judged by different standards. The reasons for the
double standard are not at all clear given that the claims purchaser
may serve a beneficial purpose in the reorganization process.
110
Judge Cosetti was concerned that a claims purchaser with a
blocking position "disenfranchises" the other claim holders,
contrary to congressional intent." To the contrary, the two-
thirds in amount and one-half in number requirements for voting
detailed in section 1126(c)112 establish a delicate balance in the
negotiating power of the parties to a reorganization. The two-thirds
rule gives a substantial minority a substantial voice to use in its self-
interest. The poison pill upsets this balance. The debtor in
possession has considerable power by virtue of its right to operate
the business113 and its right to the exclusivity period.114 A
claims purchaser with the resources to amass a blocking position
and the expertise to use that position to negotiate a more equitable
plan may be management's only serious rival.
Japonica's bad faith actions in trying to secure passage of its own plan should not
mean thatJaponica acted in bad faith in vetoing the debtor's plan. The plans, and
the votes on them, were separate and thus required separate good faith inquiries. It
is possible, however, that the court foundJaponica's actions in securing a majority for
its plan so egregious that the court, perhaps unnecessarily, condemnedJaponica's less
offensive action of voting its minority blocking position against the debtor's plan.
109 Judge Cosetti gave great weight to both the timing and prices of the purchases
made byJaponica. See id. at 286-87 and 289-90. Though section 1126(e) makes no
mention of timing or price paid, section 203 of the Bankruptcy Act allowed a court
discretion to assign them weight or not. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
The majority of the cases decided under the Bankruptcy Act, however, assign little
importance to the issues of timing and price. See supra note 51.
110 Seesupra notes 24-35 (identifying positive aspects of claim purchaser participa-
tion).
" Allegheny, 118 Bankr. at 290. Otherjudges under similar circumstances have
not shared this concern. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
112 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
11 The debtor in possession can use the property of the estate and enter into
transactions in the ordinary course of business without notice or a hearing. See 11
U.S.C. § 363(c)(1) (1988).
114 Only the debtor may file a reorganization plan in the first 120 days after the
bankruptcy petition is filed. The bankruptcy court can, and often does, extend the
period of exclusivity. See 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b) & (d) (1988).
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A final point to be made regarding Allegheny is that it casts
serious doubt on the vitality of the permissive stand taken on dual
class voting in In re Gilbert. 115 Japonica purchased enough claims
in class 4 to block the plan's acceptance and support the blocking
position Japonica already held in class 2.116 Unfortunately, the
two classes held opposite positions with respect to the outcome of
pending litigation.1 17 The Allegheny court stopped just short of
finding the dual class voting strategy to be in bad faith.118 Under
the less permissive approach, a creditor casting its class B votes
must vote in light of its interests as a member of class B and not in
aid of its interest as a creditor in class A. If a claims purchaser were
to vote both his class A votes and class B votes in aid of his interest
in class A, logic suggests that only the class B votes should be
disqualified as in bad faith. The class A votes were voted only in aid
of class A interests. Therefore, even under the less permissive
approach, the claims purchaser should be left with his original
blocking position in class A. In Allegheny, Japonica's votes in all
classes were disqualified, contrary to the logic stated above.
119
C. Changing Market Conditions
At least two significant recent developments have received
insufficient notice in the debate surrounding trading claims. These
developments impact how permissive the good faith standard should
be.
One development is the increasing sophistication of the players
and the mechanisms involved in reorganization. The sophistication
is the result of the increased volume of bankruptcy filings and the
experience gained in dealing with them. Claim purchasers find
profit in distressed claims because they trade at a discount to their
"true" or "realizable" value. 120 Evidence suggests, however, that
115 104 Bankr. 206 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1989); see supra notes 80-87 and accompany-
ing text.
116 See Allegheny, 118 Bankr. at 290.
117 See id. at 287.
118 See id. at 290 ("The court is hard pressed to characterizeJaponica's actions as
merely furthering their own economic interests.").
119 See id.
120 See generally Kraakman, Taking Discounts Seriously: The Implications of
'Discounted" Share Prices As An Acquisition Motive, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 891 (1988).
Professor Kraakman states:
[T]here is a growing theoretical literature on 'mispricing' behavior, which
argues that uninformed traders may introduce persistent biases or
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the discounts are becoming rarer. 121 The increased investment in
vulture funds accounts for part of the erosion in discounts since
increased demand bids up the prices of the claims. Sellers who are
better informed about the meaning and consequences of a bank-
ruptcy filing account for the remainder of the erosion of discounts.
Traders selling on organized markets are less likely to touch off the
uninformed "noise" or "panic" trading which results in mis-
pricing.122  Selling into an unorganized market, institutional
lenders with a long-time relationship with the debtor are better able
to apply their knowledge of the debtor's finances to the bankruptcy
context. Similarly, trade claimants are better able to apply their
knowledge of the debtor's industry and its future to the bankruptcy
context. An institutional lender or trade claimant who has failed to
become more sophisticated with respect to bankruptcy may likely
still benefit by simply asking the prices received by more sophisticat-
ed players involved with the same debtor.
The increased sophistication of claim sellers and the concomi-
tant erosion of the discount at which claims sell cast doubt on the
assertion that claims purchasers take advantage of sellers.
123
Sophisticated claim holders benefit from a ready market for their
claims. By selling, claim holders who are not in the business of
pressing claims against distressed debtors can capture a portion of
the value added by buyers who are in the business of pressing such
claims. If buyers are permitted to exercise a minority (34%) veto,
cumulative noise into share prices or that speculative trading might lead to
positive or negative price 'bubbles.'.. . [S]ome commentators suggest that
noise trading further distorts share prices by encouraging informed traders
to speculate on noise and by imposing 'noise trader risk' on all traders in
a noisy market. Finally, noise theorists find evidence of mispricing in the
long-term price behavior of both individual firms and the entire market.
Id. at 899-90 (footnotes omitted).
121 See e.g., 'Debt Raiders,'supra note 1, at D8, col. 2 ("Indeed, there has recently
been such a surge of interest in distressed debt that some longtime bankruptcy
investors are complaining that they can't make any real money."). Situations in which
experienced claims purchasers have lost large portions of their investments also serve
as evidence of the evaporation of discounts. For example, Balfour acknowledged
losing $13.5 million on its investment of $50 million in Global Marine. See id. Amroc
Investments L.P. has seen its $2.1 million investment in trade claims against Eastern
Air Lines purchased from Marriot lose almost all of its value. See In re Ionosphere
Clubs, Inc., 119 Bankr. 440, 442 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990). Bankruptcy specialist Stan
Phelps paid an average of 15 cents on the dollar for MGF Oil bonds, which are now
worth less than one cent each. See Schifrin, supra note 3, at 77.
122 See supra note 120.
123 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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the value added to the claims they purchase will be greater and the
sophisticated seller will, in turn, be able to negotiate a higher price.
Furthermore, a ready market for claims makes people more willing
to do business with a distressed but not yet bankrupt debtor. The
ability to sell claims quickly at a higher price makes the consequenc-
es of the debtor's failure l.ess costly. The institutional lender or
trade creditor can recover more money and more quickly channel
it back into its own field of business.
The second development receiving insufficient attention is the
changing reasons why many large debtors enter bankruptcy. Until
only a few years ago, most of the large companies which entered
bankruptcy did so because of serious operational or product
problems. 124 Many of the large bankruptcy filings today, howev-
er, are not the result of operational decline but rather the result of
excessive debt in the capital structure1 25 or of liabilities stemming
from past product problems.1
26
The changing reasons for filing bankruptcy in turn alter the
dynamic of the reorganization process. When a debtor is in
operational decline, the bankruptcy is primarily a battle among
creditors to split up the losses. When a debtor is operationally
healthy but financially sick, the reorganization is more of a battle
between creditors as a group and the debtor to decide who will bear
the losses. The debtor's management, even though it has the
fiduciary responsibility of a trustee, increasingly champions the
debtor's interests at the expense of the creditors because of
management's interest in being employed by the reorganized
entity.' 27  Management has tremendous power in the reorgani-
124 See Roe, supra note 65, at 273 n.127 ("Bankruptcy is usually a reflection of
operational decline. The frictions; of bankruptcy exacerbate the decline, but most
observable costs are not the result of the bankruptcy system itself but of the firm's
poor prospects.").
12?Good examples are companies which took on excessive debt to accomplish or
fend off buy outs but which could not handle interest payments, including Carter
Hawley Hale Stores, Campeau Corp., and Interco. Many other companies are
similarly situated, although they are attempting debt-exchange offers to avoid a
bankruptcy filing. Western Union and Community Newspapers, Inc. are representa-
tive of the latter group.
126 Good examples are companies which entered bankruptcy to deal with large
product liability claims, such as Manville, Eagle-Pitcher Corp., and A. H. Robins.
127 See, e.g., Fortgang & Mayer, supra note 2, at 113-14 (noting that management
at times acts for the debtor at the expense of the creditors by, for example, rejecting
an executory contract which increases the debtor's cash flow and therefore its value
as an enterprise but results in a damage claim which is larger than the gain, thereby
diluting the unsecured creditors' recovery); Roe, supra note 65, at 266-67 ("[T]he
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zation process by virtue of its control over the debtor and by virtue
of the exclusivity period. 28 Meanwhile, collective action prob-
lems hinder creditors in opposing management. The result is that
management's notion of how the reorganization should proceed
may be the only notion given due consideration. A veto exercised
by a claim purchaser may be the only mechanism ensuring that an
alternative notion is considered fully.
IV. ToWARDS A FRAMEWORK FOR APPLYING SECTION 1126(e)
Workout negotiations take place in the shadow of chapter 11
bankruptcy negotiations, which in turn, take place in the shadow of
a voting contest for approval of a plan of reorganization. 129 Thus,
impairment of the voting rights attached to a claim weakens the
negotiating position of its holder at each prior stage and as a result
reduces the value of the claim even if the process never comes to a
contested vote.
13 0
The cumulative loss to original claim holders caused by voting
restrictions placed on claim purchasers may be substantial, yet may
be difficult for ajudge to see or measure. On the other hand, the
gains which result from a vote disqualification in a single, particular-
ly contentious case are easy for a judge to see. Confirmation of a
plan moves that case a giant step closer to completion.131 Fur-
ther, claims purchasers may be too readily labeled "vultures,"
current framework for reorganization gives managers, presumed to be allies of
shareholders, substantial control over the reorganization process. Managers might
delay in hope of an economic upturn and a resurgence of the bankrupt firm.").
128 See supra notes 113-14.
129 See generally Roe, supra note 65, at 253-79 (discussing how aspects of
bankruptcy law affect the strategic action of parties prior to the bankruptcy).
130 See In re Lorraine Castle Apartments Bldg. Corp., 149 F.2d 55, 58 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 326 U.S. 728 (1945) (holding that allowing a claims purchaser to
participate only to the extent of the price he paid for the claim rather than the claim's
par value "would result in unearned, undeserved profit for the debtor, [and] destroy
or impair the sales value of securities by abolishing the profit motive, which inspires
purchasers"); Note, Equity Power of Bankruptcy Courts Over Classification and Assignment
of Claim, 50 YALE L.J. 892, 899 n.47 (1941) ("Speculation alone is not a danger. Too
rigid restriction upon speculative activity would depress the market prices of claims
and prevent financially pressed creditors from unloading prior to lengthy reorganiza-
tion proceedings." (citations omitted)).
1r, This observation is especially true when the case is a large, complex bankruptcy
which has plagued the court's calendar for many months. Allegheny, for example,
traversed 22 months in bankruptcy and 12 reorganization plans before a plan was
confirmed, though Japonica had only been involved for a fraction of that time. See
In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 118 Bankr. 282, 285-86 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990).
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precluding adequate consideration of the positive aspects of the role
they play.1 3 2 The result will often be a finding of bad faith, which
serves as poor precedent.
The most equitable safeguard is to give the claims purchaser the
benefit of a presumption of good faith for the purposes of section
1126(e). Bankruptcy courts have not been consistent in their
placement of the burden of showing the motive or effect of the
claim purchaser's participation.1 3 3 The presumption would force
the court to begin its analysis from a point which recognizes the
claim purchaser's economic contributions. As discussed, those
contributions include the abilities to supply liquidity to creditors, to
counter management power, to consolidate claims, and to recapital-
ize the debtor.
The veto right of a claim holder with enough votes is plain from
a reading of the Bankruptcy Code.1 3 4  To undermine the veto
right through a restrictive application of section 1126(e) may be
expedient in a particular reorganization, but it disserves stake-
holders in subsequent reorganizations by denying them the benefits
of claim purchaser participation. The presumption of good faith
would force the party seeking to disqualify the claim purchaser's
vote to show that an undue delay or an improper motive has
undercut the benefits which normally accrue.
In order to be meaningful, the presumption of good faith must
be accompanied by more specific guidance as to what constitutes an
improper motive. As discussed, the test invariably applied is that
articulated in P-R Holding- an ulterior motive is one which is in aid
of an interest other than an interest as a creditor. 135 The variable
is how permissively one's "interest as a creditor" will be interpreted
by the court. The more permissive interpretation would allow a
claim holder to seek a relationship with the reorganized entity if
that would maximize the return on its claim. Other claim holders
are clearly already allowed to seek such relationships. 13 6 Thus,
132 See supra notes 24-35 and accompanying text.
133 Compare In re Landau Boat Co., 8 Bankr. 432, 435 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981)
(placing the burden on the debtor to establish claim holder's improper motive before
asking claim holder to testify regarding its motive) with Allegheny, 118 Bankr. at 289
(placing burden on claim purchaser to justify its motives).
134 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
135 See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
136 For example, trade claimants may agree to a lesser payment in the reorganiza-
tion plan to encourage a profitable relation with the reorganized company.
Employees may similarly believe their interests are best pursued in post reorganiza-
tion contract negotiations.
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claim purchasers are put on the most equal footing and claim sellers
receive fullest value if purchasers can properly have the furtherance
of a relationship with the reorganized entity as their motive. In the
case of claim purchasers, the relationship would most likely be that
of stockholder.
13 7
The most pronounced effect of a presumption of good faith
would be to eliminate consideration of the timing and pricing of
claim purchases in the good faith calculus. Timing and pricing offer
no direct evidence as to motive, 13s which is the key element in the
good faith determination.1 3 9 Statutory language never stated or
implied that the timing or pricing of claim purchases should be
assigned importance.1 40 Consideration of timing and pricing tend
to cloud the issue of motive 141 and should, therefore, be elimin-
ated.
The net effect of the presumption recommended here will
probably be to further the adoption of the permissive approach in
the bankruptcy courts. Courts which have focused on the issue of
motive have most often found blocking minorities to be within their
economic rights as long as the minorities were trying to maximize
returns on their investment in the debtor.1 42 The next logical
question is whether adoption of the permissive approach to good
faith is a good result. The answer is affirmative if one is convinced
that the benefits of claim purchaser participation in the reorganiza-
7 Having the motive of becoming a controlling stockholder is more problematic.
Presumably only one party can be the controlling stockholder, and thus to demand
that position in return for one's vote would violate the prohibition against
discriminatory treatment within a class, articulated in Young v. Higbee Co., 324 U.S.
204 (1945). See supra note 62-63 and accompanying text.138 See e.g., In re Lorraine Castle Apartments Bldg. Corp., 149 F.2d 55, 58 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 728 (1945) (holding that a late purchase of a security for
a discounted price did not supply the "equitable reason" necessary to limit the
security holder's participation in the reorganization).
139 See In re P-R Holding Corp., 147 F.2d 895, 897 (2d Cir. 1945) (stating that
"[w]hen [a] purchase is in aid of an interest other than an interest as a creditor, such
purchase may amount to 'bad faith'"); In re Pine Hill Collieries Co., 46 F. Supp. 669,
671 (E.D. Pa. 1942) (stating that the test of "good faith" lies in the motives of the
holder of the claims).
140 Section 203 of the Bankruptcy Act stated that the judge could find bad faith
"in light of or irrespective of the time of acquisition" of the claim. Section 203 made
no mention at all of pricing. Though section 1126(e) of the Bankruptcy Code was
derived from section 203 of the Bankruptcy Act, section 1126(e) makes no mention
at all of either timing or pricing in the good faith inquiry. See supra notes 49-51 and
accompanying text.
141 See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
142 See supra notes 55-56.
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tion process outweigh the costs.143 Even those people who are
not so convinced will still probably agree that uncertainty as to what
the law says is costly to both buyers and sellers in the claims market.
It is precisely the uncertainty in the law surrounding the application
of section 1126(e) which is most intolerable.
The application of section 1126(e) to claim purchasers needs
clarification. Voting power in bankruptcy impacts negotiating
power both before and after the bankruptcy filing. The parties to
a bankruptcy and the parties participating in the market for claims
must understand what actions constitute bad faith in order to adjust
their pricing and behavior. A presumption of good faith in favor of
claim purchasers can be used to clarify the limits of good faith and
to facilitate a liquid, efficient market in claims.
14 See supra notes 25-35 & 120-26 and accompanying text (arguing that the
benefits are substantial and increasing while the costs are low and declining).
